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JURISDICTION OF THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
Inasmuch as the Utah Supreme Court has transferred this appeal, this Court 
has original jurisdiction over the appeal pursuant to section 78-2a-3(2)(j) of the 
Utah Code. 
ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
1. Whether the trial court erred by concluding, either as a matter of law 
or undisputed fact, that the insured's death was not accidental, as is required for 
coverage under the insured's life insurance policy. (R. 69-72, 117-21, 129). 
Inasmuch as summary judgment is granted as a matter of law, this issue is 
reviewed by the appellate court for correctness. White v. Deseelhorst 879 P.2d 
1371, 1374 (Utah 1994). Accordingly, the appellate court accords no deference to 
the trial court's conclusion that the facts are not in dispute nor the court's legal 
conclusions based on those facts. Travelers Ins. Co. v. KearL 896 P.2d 644, 646 
(Utah App. 1995). In addition, the appellate court will view the properly 
submitted evidence, and the facts and inferences thereby supported, in a light most 
favorable to the party opposing summary judgment. Id at 647. 
2. Whether the trial court erred by concluding that the language of the 
"felony" exclusion contained in the insurance policy is clear and unambiguous and 
capable of only one interpretation. (R. 27-28, 73-75, 108-16, 129-30). Whether 
the terms of a contract are ambiguous is a question of law which the appellate 
1 
court reviews for correctness. Alf v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 850 P.2d 1272, 
1274 (Utah 1993); Wade v. StangL 869 P.2d 9, 12 (Utah App. 1994). 
3. Whether the trial court erred by failing to construe the ambiguous 
insurance policy provisions in favor of coverage of the insured and to thus grant 
summary judgment in favor of the Plaintiff in this case. (R. 27-28, 73-75, 108-16, 
129-30). This issue presents a question of law, dependent on the interpretation of 
binding case law, which the appellate court reviews for correctness. State v. 
Richardson. 843 P.2d 517, 518 (Utah App. 1992). Moreover, a trial court's 
determination of what legal principles to apply is reviewed for correctness. State 
exrel.H.R.V.. 906 P.2d 913, 915 (Utah App. 1995). 
4. Whether the trial court erred by concluding, either as a matter of 
undisputed fact or of law, that the insured's death arose from the insured's 
committing an assault or felony such that the "felony" exclusion in the insurance 
policy applied. (R. 20-26, 76-78). Inasmuch as summary judgment is granted as a 
matter of law, this issue is reviewed by the appellate court for correctness. White 
v. Deseelhorst 879 P.2d 1371, 1374 (Utah 1994). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
I. Nature of the Case: This case involves a dispute between Marilyn 
Murdock, the beneficiary of a life insurance policy that provides accidental death 
benefits, and Monumental Life Insurance Company. Mrs. Murdock's husband, the 
insured, was killed when he was inadvertently run over by a van as he fled the 
scene of a robbery, in which he participated. The insurance company refuses to 
pay the $100,000 accidental death benefit, claiming that the insured's death was 
not accidental and was attributable to the insured's commission of an assault or 
felony, and is thus excluded from coverage under the policy. 
II. Course of Proceedings and Disposition in Trial Court: Mrs. 
Murdock commenced an action against Monumental Life Insurance Company by 
filing a Complaint on February 10, 1998, alleging breach of contract, among other 
things. (R. 1). The insurance company filed an Answer on March 27, 1998, 
alleging that the death was not accidental and that any coverage could be legally 
denied pursuant to the aforementioned "felony" exclusion. (R. 9). Both parties 
moved for summary judgment, with Mrs. Murdock filing her motion on May 21, 
1998, and with the insurance company filing its motion on June 12, 1998. (R. 16, 
93). A hearing was held on the motions before Judge McCleve on July 17, 1999. 
(R. 160). Judge McCleve ultimately denied Mrs. Murdock's motion for summary 
judgment and granted summary judgment in favor of the insurance company. A 
Memorandum Decision was issued on August 4, 1998, and the Order was entered 
on August 18, 1998. (R. 137, 141). Copies of the Memorandum Decision and the 
Order are attached as Exhibit "A" of the Addendum to this Brief. This appeal 
ensued. 
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STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS 
1. On or about April 23, 1996, Zachary Murdock, participated in the 
robbery of two employees of a local movie theater as they attempted to make a late 
night deposit at a local bank. (R. 10, 67-68). 
2. Upon completing the robbery, Mr. Murdock and an unknown 
accomplice fled the scene of the crime by running away on foot. (R. 10, 19, 68). 
3. Mr. Murdock and the accomplice fled the immediate vicinity of the 
bank and ran into a field full of construction debris. (R. 68). 
4. Once the two men had fled, the victims were no longer being 
attacked or threatened, but one of the victims, Richard Moser, subsequently got 
into* a van arid chased after Mr. Murdock and his accomplice in order to try to get 
the money back. (R. 91). 
5. Mr. Moser ultimately drove the vehicle over two cement dividers, 
through a parking lot, and into the field full of construction debris. (R. 19, 68). 
6. Approximately three hundred feet from the crime scene, the vehicle 
struck Mr. Murdock, causing his death. (R. 2, 10, 68, & R. 160, T. 25, 41). 
7. Mr. Moser maintains that he did not intend to collide with Mr. 
Murdock. (R. 19, 38-52, 68, R. 160, T. 27). 
8. The unknown accomplice escaped with the money. (R. 68, 91). 
9. At the time of his death, Mr. Murdochs life was insured under two 
accidental life insurance policies with Monumental Life Insurance Company. (R. 
66). 
10. Mrs. Murdock, the decedent's wife, was named as the beneficiary of 
the policies purchased by Mr. Murdock. (R. 2, 10, 19). 
11. Mrs. Murdock attempted to make a claim on the aforementioned life 
insurance policy as a result of the accidental death of her husband. (R. 2, 10). 
12. The insurance company subsequently denied the claim and refused to 
pay the benefits, relying upon its assertion that Mr. Murdock's death was not 
accidental, and further relying upon an exclusion contained in the policy that 
purports to deny coverage if the death was caused by, resulted from, or contributed 
to by "committing an assault or felony." (R. 2, 10). 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Mr. Murdock's death was accidental inasmuch as it was not the natural and 
probable consequence of his prior actions. It does not "ordinarily" follow under 
these circumstances that the victim would pursue Mr. Murdock and run him down 
in a vehicle; thus, Mr. Murdock's death was not a "natural" consequence of his 
prior actions. More importantly, the events were certainly not the "probable" 
consequence of Mr. Murdock's actions-more likely to happen than to not happen. 
Viewing the facts in the light most favorable to Mrs. Murdock, the trial court erred 
in concluding that Mr. Murdock's death was not an accident. 
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Mr. Murdock's death did not arise out of any assault or felony such that 
Monumental^ "felony" exclusion applied to deny coverage. Exclusions must be 
strictly construed against the insurer. Moreover, there must be a sufficient causal 
link between any assault or felony and the death, including a sufficient relation in 
time and place, for the exclusion to apply. Because Mr. Murdock had already fled 
the crime scene, had already completed any assault or felony, and had already 
withdrawn any felonious intent by the time he was killed, there was no adequate 
causal relationship between the death and any assault or felony. In addition, the 
auto-pedestrian collision could be seen as an intervening and superseding cause, 
such as to eliminate the causation link. Furthermore, narrow construction of the 
exclusion leads to the conclusion that Mr. Murdock was not "committing" an 
assault or felony when his death occurred; thus, the exclusion should not apply. 
Finally, whether Mr. Murdock's death falls within the exclusion is a fact-sensitive 
question, inappropriate for determination on summary judgment. Indeed, when 
viewing the facts and inferences in a light most favorable to Mrs. Murdock's 
position, the trial court erred in granting summary judgment. 
Finally, the language of the "felony" exclusion in the insurance policy is 
ambiguous. It is uncertain whether the exclusion refers to the insured's own acts or 
to those of another person or both. In addition, the uncertainty is not resolved by 
viewing all the listed exclusions as a whole. Ambiguities and uncertainties in an 
insurance contract must be construed against the insurance company and in favor 
of coverage whenever possible, regardless of what the most logical construction 
would be. Accordingly, the trial court erred in determining that the "felony" 
exclusion was plain and unambiguous in this case. 
ARGUMENT 
The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Monumental Life 
Insurance Company (hereinafter "Monumental"), concluding, as a matter of law, 
that Mr. Murdock's death arose out of his felonious conduct, that his death was not 
accidental, and that the death benefit is excluded by the plain meaning of the 
parties' insurance contract. 
"Summary judgment is appropriate only when no genuine issues of material 
fact exist and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Glover 
v. Boy Scouts of Am.. 923 P.2d 1383, 1385 (Utah 1996); see also Utah R. Civ. P. 
56(c). Inasmuch as summary judgment is granted as a matter of law, the trial 
court's ruling is reviewed for correctness. White v. Deseelhorst 879 P.2d 1371, 
1374 (Utah 1994). Accordingly, the appellate court accords no deference to the 
trial court's conclusion that the facts are not in dispute, nor the court's legal 
conclusions based on those facts. Travelers Ins. Co. v. KearL 896 P.2d 644, 646 
(Utah App. 1995). Finally, all 
[d]oubts, uncertainties or inferences concerning issues of fact must 
be construed in a light most favorable to the party opposing summary 
judgment. Litigants must be able to present their cases fully to the 
court before judgment can be rendered against them unless it is 
obvious . . . that the party opposing judgment can establish no right 
to recovery. 
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Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Atkin. Wright & Miles. 681 P.2d 1258, 1261 
(Utah 1984). 
I. The Trial Court Erred by Concluding that 
Mr. Murdockfs Death was not Accidental, 
The parties' insurance contract provided for the payment of an accidental 
death benefit for situations in which Mdeath occurs as a direct result of an injury" 
and "within 365 days" of the occurrence of the event causing the "injury". 
Moreover, the term "injury" is defined in the policy as "bodily injury caused by an 
accident." A copy of the policy is attached as Exhibit "B" in the Addendum to this 
Brief. 
Mrs. Murdock has the burden to establish that her husband died within the 
aforementioned parameters giving rise to coverage under the policy. Se generally 
Quaker State Mini-Lube. Inc. v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co.. 868 F.Supp. 1278 (D. 
Utah 1994). The trial concluded that, as a matter of law, Mr. Murdock's death was 
not accidental. By so concluding, the trial court removed the insured from the 
scope of coverage of the accidental death policy. 
Nevertheless, when viewing the facts in the light most favorable to Mrs. 
Murdock, and when applying the proper legal principles to those facts, the trial 
court erred by reaching the conclusion it did. 
The term "accident" is not expressly defined in the policy. However, Utah 
courts have adequately set forth the standard to apply when determining if an event 
should be considered an "accident" or "accidental" for purposes of an accidental 
death policy. In 1921, the Utah Supreme Court first indicated that "accident" and 
"accidental" are: 
descriptive of means which produce effects which are not their 
natural and probable consequences . . . . An effect which is the 
natural and probable consequence of an act or course of action is not 
an accident, nor is it produced by accidental means. It is either the 
result of actual design, or it falls under the maxim that every man 
must be held to intend the natural and probable consequences of his 
deeds. 
Richards v. Standard Accident Ins. Co.. 200 P. 1017, 1023 (Utah 1921). That 
court further declared that: 
[t]he natural consequences of means used [is] the consequence 
which ordinarily follows from their use—the result which may be 
reasonably anticipated from their use, and which ought to be 
expected. The probable consequence of the use of given means is 
the consequence which is more likely to follow from their use than it 
is to fail to follow. 
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Indeed, Utah courts still follow these same guidelines when determining 
whether death resulted from an accident for purposes of insurance coverage. See 
Hoffman v. Life Ins. Co. of North Am.. 669 P.2d 410, 415-16 (Utah 1983). In 
Hoffman, the court further clarified that "a person is a victim of an accident when, 
from the victim's point of view, the occurrence causing the injury or death is not a 
natural and probable result of the victim's own acts." Id at 416 (emphasis in 
original). 
Moreover, "the test is not whether the result was foreseeable, but whether it 
was expected... . [Sjince the common meaning of the term ["accident"] is 
Q 
defined in terms of whether the event was naturally and probably expected or 
anticipated by the insured, it is that definition which must be applied, and not one 
founded on foreseeability." Id. 
While it may have been "foreseeable" that one of Mr. Murdock's robbery 
victims, though not the owner of the stolen property and no longer in immediate 
danger, might give pursuit in a vehicle, might drive over cement barriers and into a 
field full of construction debris, and might unintentionally collide with Mr. 
Murdock, causing his death, such a sequence of events certainly could not be 
viewed to be the "natural and probable consequence" of the completed robbery. 
This especially so if the events are analyzed from Mr. Murdock's point of view, as 
Hoffman mandates, and if the facts are viewed in a light most favorable to 
concluding the death was accidental, as determination of a summary judgment 
motion would mandate. 
It does not "ordinarily" follow under these circumstances that the victim 
would pursue Mr. Murdock and run him down in a vehicle; thus, Mr. Murdockfs 
death was not a "natural" consequence of his prior actions. More importantly, the 
events were certainly not the "probable" consequence of Mr. Murdock's actions-
more likely to happen than to not happen. The result would seem even less 
probable in light of the fact that Mr. Moser did not intend to run down Mr. 
Murdock with the van. 
Applying these established rules, the Utah Supreme Court has previously 
held that two juvenile boys, intentionally fleeing from a law enforcement officer in 
a stolen vehicle at speeds exceeding eighty miles per hour, could not reasonably 
have anticipated that death or injury was likely to result from a high-speed chase. 
Sanders v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co.. 138 P.2d 239, 242 (Utah 1943). 
It is clearly more likely that death or injury would result under the 
circumstances occurring in Sanders than under the circumstances involving Mr. 
Murdock. Even so, the Sanders court concluded that the boys' death was 
accidental. The trial court in our case even indicated that she even considered that 
the events "might be foreseeable, but not likely." (R. 160, T. 29). Accordingly, 
the trial court erred by concluding that Mr. Murdock's death was not accidental. 
II. The Trial Court Erred by Concluding that 
Mr. Murdock's Death Arose out of Felonious Conduct. 
The parties' life insurance policy in this case also contains a list of 
exclusions from coverage. More specifically, the insurance contract provides that 
"We will not pay a benefit for a loss which is caused by, results from, or 
contributed to by . . . committing an assault or felony." It is Mrs. Murdock's 
contention that this exclusion is ambiguous because it is unclear whose conduct it 
refers to. In any event, assuming, arguendo, that the exclusion language can only 
be referring to Mr. Murdock's "committing an assault or felony," the trial court 
erred by concluding, as a matter of law, that his death in fact arose from his 
committing an assault or felony, and that any death benefit was therefore excluded. 
1 1 
Utah law makes it clear that the insurer has the burden to prove that an 
exclusion to coverage applies such that the insurer can escape liability. Browning 
v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc. 80 P.2d 348, 350-51 (Utah 1938). Moreover, 
Utah courts apply the basic principle that "exclusionary clauses are to be strictly 
construed against the insurer. It must not be forgotten that the purpose of 
insurance is to insure, and that construction should be taken which will render the 
contract operative, rather than inoperative/' LPS Hosp. v. Capitol Life Ins. Co., 
765 P.2d 857, 859 (Utah 1988) (quoting Phil Schroeder. Inc. v. Royal Globe Ins. 
Co.. 659 P.2d 509, 511 (Wash. 1983) (further indicating that M[e]xclusion clauses 
are strictly construed against the insurer, especially if they are of uncertain import. 
An insurer may, of course, cut off liability under its policy with a clear language, 
but it cannot do so with that dulled by ambiguity.")). 
In LPS Hospital the court was construing an accident policy exclusion that 
indicated that benefits would not be paid in cases "arising out of an attempt at 
assault or felony." Id at 858. The Utah Supreme Court chose to adopt the 
position that the insurer had to first establish a "causal relationship" between the 
insured's injuries and the felony violation, relying on a Colorado case for the 
principle that "in order to relieve the insurer of liability in such situations, the 
insured must have been actually engaged in a felony at the time and place of the 
injury." Id at 860. 
The court in LPS Hospital then proceeded to analyze the facts of that case, 
and concluded that the felony "was merely incidental to" the insured's injuries and 
that the insurer improperly denied coverage. Id The court so concluded because 
the insured's conduct in driving while legally intoxicated and colliding head-on 
with another vehicle did not technically become felonious until the person with 
whom the insured collided died five minutes later. IdL Accordingly, despite the 
fact that the events giving rise to the felony of manslaughter, to which the insured 
later pleaded guilty, had already been set in irreversible motion at the time the 
insured was injured in the collision, the insured's injuries were not sufficiently 
caused by the felony. Id at 858, 860. 
Applying the same principles of strict construction and burden of proof to 
this case, the trial court should not have concluded, as a matter of law, that Mr. 
Murdock's death had a sufficient causal link with the commission of any assault or 
felony to allow Monumental to avoid paying the benefits for which Mr. Murdock 
contracted. 
Any crime committed by Mr. Murdock was completed by the time he fled 
the bank area. The defining elements of any felony or assault that could have 
occurred do not include "running away," as was occurring in this case when Mr. 
Murdock was inadvertantly killed by Mr. Moser. If Mr. Murdock had committed 
an assault or felony, he was already guilty of the assault or felony whether he ran 
away or not, and whether he actually escaped or not. Accordingly, Mr. Murdock's 
fleeing a crime scene and being accidently run over, were not sufficiently 
connected to the "time and place" of crime to establish the necessary causal link 
any more than the events in LPS Hospital were tied to the time and place of the 
felony committed by the insured in that case. 
Indeed, other courts have required a legally proximate causal connection 
between the allegedly excluded conduct and the injury received. Where the life 
policy contained an exclusion for death resulting from a violation of the law, an 
Indiana court held that "[n]ot only must there be a causative connection between 
the violation of law and the death, but such connection must be direct and not 
indirect: proximate or immediate, and not remote." Ben Hur Life Ass'n v. Cox. 
181 N.E. 528, 531 (Ind. App. 1932). The auto-pedestrian collision that caused Mr. 
Murdochs death could easily be considered an intervening and superseding cause 
to break the chain of proximate causation. 
Of more significance to our case, when the insured was killed when his own 
gun discharged in a scuffle with a person whose home the insured had just 
burglarized and from whom the insured was trying to escape, the Arizona Supreme 
Court held that "[t]he cause of his injury was not the burglary, but the accidental 
discharge of the weapon after the commission of the crime. Where one is killed 
while attempting to escape or to avoid arrest after the commission of the crime it is 
not within the [felony] exception." Jordan v. Logia Suprema de la Alianza 
Hispano-Americana. 206 P. 162, 164 (Ariz. 1922) (emphasis added). 
Moreover, cases in other jurisdictions have held that if the insured is no 
longer engaged in the excluded event at the time of his death, then the exclusion 
no longer applies, even if the chain of events may have included, and to an extent 
precipitated by, the conduct of the insured intended to be excluded under the 
policy. For example, in Denies v. First Nat'l Life Ins. Co.. 144 So. 2d 570 (La. 
App. 1962), the life insurance policy included an exclusion in the case where death 
occurred "while fighting . . . or violating the law." Li at 572. The insured in that 
case had provoked a bar fight, but had been persuaded to leave the bar and had 
reached his vehicle when the person with whom he had been fighting inside 
approached the insured and the two engaged in fighting again, during which time 
another individual shot and killed the insured. IdL at 571-73. The court concluded 
that the exclusion should not apply because the insured had "withdrawn from the 
affray" and was no longer "the aggressor" when he was shot. Id at 573. The 
court reached this conclusion despite the fact that the insured was fighting at the 
time of his death, and even though it would not seem unreasonable that the person 
with whom he had initiated the fighting inside the bar might come after him 
outside the bar. 
The evidence in our case would support an inference that Mr. Murdock, 
similarly, had withdrawn any felonious intent at the time he was running away. 
The trial court in our case seemed to be of the opinion that "[f]leeing is not 
withdrawing felonious intent." (R. 160, T. 18). Nevertheless, what more could 
Mr. Murdock do to withdraw such intent? If a vehicle was fast approaching from 
behind, it would not be logical to simply stop in place. Death or serious injury 
would become even more possible by doing so. In addition, the accomplice 
escaped with the stolen money. No evidence has ever indicated that Mr. Murdock 
was carrying the money bag, which he could then have dropped to evidence his 
present intent. 
Clearly Mr. Murdock's actual intent at the time of his death, like that of the 
insured in Denies, should be extremely relevant to determine whether or not he 
was committing an assault or felony at the time. Viewing the facts and inferences 
in a light most favorable to Mrs. Murdock, the trial court should have at least 
concluded that a genuine issue of material fact existed with respect to Mr. 
Murdock's intention at the time of his death. 
Admittedly, Monumental's language is broad, but it still must be construed 
strictly and, if possible, in favor of coverage. The LPS Hospital court also relied 
heavily on the policy's use of the term "attempt" in the exclusion. 765 P.2d at 860-
61. In our case, Monumental's policy employs the term "committing" with 
reference to an assault an felony. The rule of strict and narrow construction 
dictates that Monumental's felony exclusion should only apply if it arises in 
connection with the "committing" of an assault or felony, stated in the present 
tense, and not if it arises after the assault or felony has already been committed, as 
would apply to Mr. Murdock's situation. LPS Hospital would seem to compel 
such a conclusion. 
Indeed, a broad reading of Monumental^ felony exclusion could result in a 
near limitless exclusion. If the insured is a convicted felon and is incarcerated and 
dies in an accidental fire while doing nothing wrong at the time, Monumental 
could still make a claim that the insured's death was "contributed to" by the felony. 
Such a result, however, would defeat the purpose of procuring insurance, and 
would not be upheld by Utah courts. 
Accordingly, the trial court erred by concluding that Monumental had met 
its burden of proof and that itfs felony exclusion applied, as a matter of law, to 
exclude coverage of Mr. Murdock under the facts of this case. In any event, 
whether or not Mr. Murdock's death was sufficiently connected to the committing 
of an assault or felony is a very fact-sensitive question. "Fact sensitive cases such 
as this do not lend themselves to a determination on summary judgment." Praper 
City v. Estate of Bernardo. 888 P.2d 1097, 1101 (Utah 1995) (being cited for the 
general proposition stated). The question should have been put to the jury. 
III. The Trial Court Erred by Concluding that Monumental's 
Felony Exclusion was Not Ambiguous and by thus Failing 
to Construe the Exclusion in Favor of Coverage. 
Utah courts do not favor insurance policy exclusions because they render 
the insurance contract inoperative rather than operative. See LPS Hosp. v. Capitol 
Life Ins. Co.. 765 P.2d 857, 858-59 (Utah 1988). This is why exclusions are to be 
construed strictly against the insurer. IdL Moreover, the law is clear in Utah that 
"any ambiguity or uncertainty in the language of an insurance contract must be 
resolved in favor of coverage." IcL at 858 (indicating as well that "since the policy 
is drawn by the insurer, ambiguities are construed against that party"). 
An insurer, of course, has an incentive to draft broad, vague, and uncertain 
exclusions so as to try to exclude coverage under the most possible interpretations, 
Accordingly, Utah courts follow the rule that "[a]n insurer may, of course, cut off 
liability under its policy with a clear language, but it cannot do so with that dulled 
by ambiguity." Id at 859. 
The exclusion in this case simply states that Monumental "will not pay a 
benefit for a loss which is caused by, results from, or contributed to by . . . 
committing an assault or felony." The exclusion does not identify whether it is 
referring to the committing of an assault or felony by the insured or by a third 
party. 
Utah courts will generally evaluate whether the insurance contract language 
would "be plain to a person of ordinary intelligence and understanding, viewing 
the matter fairly and reasonably, in accordance with the usual and natural meaning 
of the words, and in light of the existing circumstances, including the purpose of 
the policy." LI In other words, an ordinary insured, or purchaser of the policy, 
must plainly understand what is being excluded. Moreover, the "contract language 
may be ambiguous if it is unclear, omits terms, or if the terms used to express the 
intention of the parties may be understood to have two or more plausible 
meanings." Equitable Life & Casualty Ins. Co. v. Ross. 849 P.2d 1187, 1192 
(UtahApp. 1993). 
The ordinary insured would not know whether this exclusion is referring to 
his or her own conduct or to the conduct of some third person which may directly 
or indirectly result in the insured's death. Rest assured that the insurance company 
would like to claim exclusion from coverage under any and all scenarios. The trial 
court apparently accepted this all-inclusive interpretation, indicating that the 
exclusion language in question "means anybody can commit an assault or felony 
and they won't pay on the insured's case." (R. 160, T. 9). 
The confusion is amplified by the fact that the exclusions are not all drafted 
in parallel fashion, and some clearly refer to the insured and others clearly to third 
parties. For example, the policy excludes "a loss which is caused by . . . suicide." 
Obviously this exclusion refers to the insured's suicide. However, the policy also 
refers to "a loss which is caused by . . . declared or undeclared war or any act of 
war." In all likelihood, the insured will not be waging war; thus, this exclusion 
refers to acts of third persons. Others are simply unclear, including the exclusions 
for losses resulting from "alcohol intoxication," "full-time military service," 
"taking any drug," or "committing an assault or felony." 
To an extent, the trial court recognized the ambiguity but simply ignored it. 
The court expressed her view that the exclusion "could be argued to be ambiguous 
because I don't know to whom they are referring/' but later declared that "I can't 
imagine that there is any way to totally unambiguously without any vagueness 
communicate in plain English totally perfectly." (R. 160, T. 12, 14). 
Of course, any confusion could have been resolved by inserting the words 
"by the insured" or "by a third party" or a combination of the two. Nevertheless, it 
does not contain such language. When faced with a similar claim of uncertainty as 
to whose conduct is being referred, one old court held the view that the rule that 
"ambiguous terms . . . are construed most strongly against the insurer" did not 
apply "for the reason that the language employed expresses clearly an exemption 
from the risk of injuries inflicted intentionally by another as well as by the 
insured." Orr v. Travelers' Ins. Co.. 24 So. 997, 998 (Ala. 1899). The implication 
of the holding was that the exclusion would have been considered ambiguous if it 
was not clear whether it referred to acts of the insured or another party. 
Moreover, insurance companies have attempted to construe such vague 
exclusions to refer to the acts of third persons, in addition to the acts of the 
insured. For example, in Housh v. Pacific States Life Ins. Co.. 37 P.2d 741 (Cal. 
1934), the accidental death policy provided that it did "not cover any loss resulting 
from . . . suicide, sane or insane, or any attempt thereat, or intentionally inflicted 
injuries." Li at 742. The insured was shot to death by a companion. IcL The 
insurance company sought to deny coverage because death resulted from an 
intentional injury. IdL The court upheld coverage, claiming that exclusion "would 
logically refer to the acts of the parties to the contract [namely the insured in this 
case] and in the case of ambiguity in a policy of insurance as has often been said, 
such uncertainty is resolved against the insurer. Id. at 743 (emphasis added). 
In light of the uncertainty and ambiguity existing in this case, the trial court 
was obligated to construe the exclusion in favor of coverage, even if such a 
construction is not the most logical possible construction. That legal principle is 
most plainly applied in the LPS Hospital case. The most logical reading of the 
exclusion in that case would have led the court to exclude coverage. However, 
because of the ambiguity, the court construed the exclusion in favor of coverage. 
765 P.2d at 860-61. 
Accordingly, the trial court erred by concluding that the exclusion plainly 
and unambiguously applied to exclude coverage in this case. 
CONCLUSION AND RELIEF SOUGHT 
On the basis of the foregoing arguments and analysis, the Court of Appeals 
should reverse the trial court and set aside the summary judgment entered in favor 
of Monumental. In addition, the Court of Appeals should conclude that the 
"felony" exclusion in this case is ambiguous and direct that it be construed in favor 
of coverage. In the alternative, the Court of Appeals should either conclude as a 
matter of law that Mr. Murdock's death was not sufficiently connected to the 
commission of any assault or felony or else remand the case for trial with respect 
to that issue. 
DATED this \°i°^ day of July, 1999. 
m.C NIELSON 
JAMES K. HASLAM 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I caused to be mailed by U.S. mail, postage 
prepaid, z true and correct copjf of the foregoing BRIEF OF APPELLANT this 
/ < ? * day of July, 1999, to the following: 
Joy L. Clegg 
Snow, Christensen & Martineau 
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor 
Post Office Box 45000 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
MARILYN MURDOCK, : MEMORANDUM DECISION 
Plaintiff, : CASE NO. 980901404 
vs. : 
MONUMENTAL LIFE INSURANCE 
COMPANY, a foreign corporation doing 
business in Utah, 
Defendant. : 
Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment and defendant's cross Motion for 
Summary Judgment came on for hearing on July 17,1998. Defendant's submitted courtesy 
copies of cases cited in briefs on July 20,1998 and plaintiff submitted courtesy copies of 
cases on July 28,1998. Now being fully advised in the premises, the Court finds that no 
material issues of fact are in dispute in this case. 
In April of 1996 Richard Moser and Deb Alires went to deposit the night's theatre 
receipts at a Zion's Bank night drop. Zachary Murdock, the Plaintiffs husband, and an 
unknown accomplice took the money Mr. Moser carried from him after pointing a hand 
gun at him, threatening to shoot him, hitting him repeatedly with a stungun, tearing his 
clothing, gouging his chest and kicking him to the ground. They continued hitting him 
with the stungun and kicking him after he fell to the ground. After also attacking Ms. 
Alires, the men ran out of the bank area. To get the money back, Mr. Moser got into a van 
and pursued the two men into a field full of construction debris. The man with the money 
got into a gray truck and Mr. Moser tried to block his path with the van. The robber got 
away and Mr. Moser's van developed mechanical problems so he gave up the chase. Later 
Mr. Moser learned he had struck and killed one of the robbers when he was driving the 
van. The robber who was killed was the plaintiffs husband. He had obtained group 
accidental death insurance with the defendant. Under the decedent's plan an accidental 
death benefit will not be paid to the beneficiary for a loss which has been excluded from 
coverage. The pertinent exclusionary language reads: 
"We will not pay a benefit for a loss which is caused by, results from, or contributed 
to by: 
( 4 ) . . . committing an assault or felony;.. . " 
This Court finds as a matter of law that the decedent's death arose out of his 
felonious conduct because Mr. Moser's immediate chase of his attackers in flight was a 
natural and probable consequence of their brutal robbery of him. Accordingly plaintiffs 
husband's death was not accidental. However, for argument's sake, even if his death 
(because unexpected by him) could somehow be considered to be accidental, nonetheless, 
the death benefit is clearly excluded by the plain meaning of the language of the contract. 
There is no ambiguity in the wording or its context. The defendant's felonious conduct is 
excluded from coverage. The Court adopts defendant's arguments in support of 
defendant's Motion as consistent with the Court's ruling. 
The Court therefore denies plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment and grants 
defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment. The defendant is to prepare an Order 
consistent with the Court's ruling. 
Dated this /_ 
J 
day of August, 1998 
DISTRICT 
MURDOCK vs. MONUMENTAL PAGE FOUR MEMORANDUM DECISION 
MAILTNG CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing Memorandum 
Decision, to the following, this ^f day of August, 1998: 
G. Eric Nelson 
BERTCH & BIRCH 
Commerce Center, Suite 100 
5296 S. Commerce Drive 
Salt Lake City, UT 84107 
Joy L. Clegg 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor 
P O Box 45000 
Salt Lake City, UT 84145 
FILED DISTftfiCT COURT 
Third Judicial District 
AUb 1 8 1998 
SALT LAKE COUNTY 
JOYL. CLEGG(A4138) 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
Attorneys for Defendant 
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor 
Post Office Box 45000 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145 
Telephone: (801)521-9000 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURI OF SAL1 LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
MARILYN MURDOCK, ORDER 
Plaintiff; 
vs. 
MONUMENTAL LIFE INSURANCE Civil No. 980901404 
COMPANY, a foreign coip oration doing 
business in Utah, Judge Sheila K. McCleve 
Defendant. 
Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment and defendant's Cross Motion for Summary 
Judgment came on for hearing on July 17, 1998, with Joy L. Clegg of Snow, Christensen & 
Martineau appearing as counsel for defendant, and G. Eric Nielson appearing as counsel for 
plaintiff. Defendant submitted courtesy copies of cases cited in briefs on July 20, 1998, and 
plaintiff submitted courtesy copies of cases on July 28, 1998. Being fiilly advised in the premises, 
the Court finds that there are no material issues of fact and it is hereby 
ORDERED. 
1. That plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment is denied; and 
2. That defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment is granted and that judgment is 
hereby granted in favor of defendant and against plaintiff, and that plaintiffs Complaint is 
dismissed with prejudice, no cause of action, without costs. 
DATED this day of 
APPROVED AS TO FORM this 
{&_ day of Q^-y*jJC^, 1998 
^f / -5 / , 1998. 
BY THE COURT: 
V 
SheihrtC McCleve 
District Court Judge 
G. Eric Nielsbn 
Attorney for plaintiff 
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Ne certify that, subject to the terms of the Group Policy, the Member named in the Certificate schedule (referred to as 
^ou, your and yours) is insured for the benefits described in this Certificate. Your eligible Dependent, if any. for whom 
Dremiums have been paid is also insured for the benefits described in this Certificate. You and your Dependent are 
eferred to as the Covered Person. 
EFFECTIVE DATE OF INSURANCE 
The insurance takes effect at 12:01 A.M. Standard Time on the Effective Date shown on the Certificate Schedule. 
n this Certificate Monumental Life Insurance Company will be called we, our or us. This Certificate summarizes certain 
provisions of the Group Policy. All coverage and provisions are subject to those in the Group Policy issued to the 
Dolicyholder. 
THIRTY DAY RIGHT TO EXAMINE CERTIFICATE 
f you are not satisfied for any reason, you may return your Certificate withir^30 days after receipt. Your premium will 
>e refunded. When so returned, the Certificate is void from the beginning. Return the Certificate to us at our Home Office 
)r to our authorized agent. 
Dur President and Secretary witness this Certificate. 







NAME AND ADDRESS OF MEMBER 
Zack Murdock 
1852 E. 4650 S. 
Salt Lake City, UT 84117 5102 




NATIONAL FINANCIAL INSTITUTION 





FIRST SECURITY BANK 
— SCHEDULE OF BENEFITS — 
ACCIDENTAL DEATH BENEFITS 
MEMBER 
UNDER AGE 65 $100,000.00* 
AGE 65 THROUGH 74 $75,000.00 
AGE 75 THROUGH 79 $50,000.00 
AGE 80 THROUGH 84 $25,000.00 
AGE 85 AND OVER $.00 
SPOUSE 
90% OF MEMBER BENEFIT (100% IF 
CHILDREN NOT COVERED) 
CHILDREN 
10% OF MEMBER BENEFIT (15% IF 
SPOUSE NOT COVERED) 
$50,000.00 Effective 01/15/94 
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Definitions 2,3 
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SCHEDULE OF BENEFITS 
Insurance Benefits are determined by this schedule and the terms of the Group Policy. 
ACCIDENT INSURANCE BENEFITS* 
Contributory Accidental Death 
An amount of insurance as selected by you from $25,000 to $150,000 in increments of $25,000. 
Dependent spouse is insured for 90% of your benefit if children are covered; 100% of your benefit if 
children are not covered. 
Dependent children are insured for 10% of your benefit if a spouse is covered; 15% of your benefit if 
spouse is not covered. 
* All benefits for Covered Persons will reduce to 75% of the Amount of Insurance Benefit on the date you attain 
age 65, to 50% at age 75, and to 25% at age 80; coverage terminates at your age 85. 
DEFINITIONS 
When used in this Certificate the following words and phrases have the meaning given. The use of any personal pronoun 
includes both genders. 
BENEFICIARY means the person or entity named by the insured Member, on forms and in a manner approved by us, 
to receive benefits. 
DEPENDENT means your spouse, unless you are legally separated; your unmarried children under age 19; or under 
age 23, if enrolled as a full-time student in an accredited college, university, vocational or technical school; and children 
whose support is required by a court decree. 
Children include natural children, stepchildren and legally adopted children^ They must be primarily dependent on you 
for support and maintenance and must live in a parent-child relationship with you. 
A spouse or child who is insured under the Group Policy as a Member will not be eligible as a Dependent. If a husband 
and wife are both insured as Members, a child will be the Dependent of only one. 
GROUP POLICY means the contract issued to the Policyholder providing the benefits described. 
INJURY means bodilv injury caused by an accident. The accident must occur while the Covered Person's insurance is 
in force under the Group Policy. The Injury must be the direct cause of the Loss and must be independent of all other 
causes. The Injury must not be caused by or contributed to by Sickness. 
LOSS means the death of the Covered Person or any physical impairment, incurred expense, or other benefit covered 
under the terms of the Group Policy and any attached Riders. 
PARTICIPATING ORGANIZATION means an Ogamzat.on An«ch has signed a Participation Agreement adopting the 
Policyholder's plan of insurance 
POLICYHOLDER means the !ega e'M<?\ r. /^cse '-jr-,e the G'ouo Policy is issued as shown on the Schedule of 
Benefits. 
POLICY MONTH mea^ the ce „•/ ^ • •• > v.i * . - - • • ; • ^?. :>' t^e -nontn. it enas on the last day of the same 
month. 
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SICKNESS means an mness or disease wnicn resuus in a coverea 1055 wnne insurance IUI mo ^ v o i c u I-OIOUM 15 m 
force under the Group Policy. 
CHANGES IN COVERAGE 
If, after your Effective Date of Insurance, you add an eligible Dependent or request a change in benefits for a Covered 
Person, the Effective Date of Insurance for the new coverage will be the beginning of the Policy Month following our 
acceptance of the enrollment form or change request, subject to the payment of any additional required premium. 
NEWBORN DEPENDENTS 
Newborn Dependents are covered at birth, however, any required premium must be paid within 31 days from birth to 
continue coverage beyond 31 days. 
ACCIDENTAL DEATH BENEFIT 
When we receive due proof that a Covered Person dies, we will pay the benefit shown on the Schedule of Benefits to 
his named Beneficiary; provided: 
(1) death occurs as a direct result of an Injury; and 
(2) death occurs within 365 days of the accident causing the Injury. 
EXPOSURE AND DISAPPEARANCE 
If by reason of an accident covered by the Group Policy a Covered Person is unavoidably exposed to the elements and, 
as a result of such exposure, suffers a covered loss and a benefit is otherwise payable, the loss will be covered by the 
Group Policy. 
If a Covered Person is involved in an accident which results in the sinking or wrecking of a licensed public conveyance 
in which he was a passenger and his body is not located within one year of such accident, it will be presumed that the 
Covered Person died as a result of an Injury. 
EXCLUSIONS 
We will not pay a benefit for a loss which is caused b;, results from, or contributed to by: 
(1) suicide, attempted suicide or intentionally self-inflicted injury, while sane or insane (in Missouri while sane); 
(2) declared or undeclared war or any act of war; 
(3) full-time military service; 
(4) participating in a riot; committing an assault or felony; 
(5) Sickness or its medical or surgical treatment, including diagnosis; 
(6) bacterial infection except through a wound accidentally sustained; 
(7) operating or riding in any kind of aircraft except as a fare-paying passenger on a regularly scheduled 
commercial flight; 
(8) alcohol intoxication, as defined in the state where the accident occurred; 
(9) taking of any drug, medication, narcotic or hallucinogen, unless as prescribed by a Physician; 
(10) taking of alcohol in combination with any drug, medication or sedative; 
{11) voluntary gas inhalation or poison voluntarily taken, administered or inhaled; 
(12) riding or driving as a professional in any kind of race for prize money or profit. 
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WHEN COVERAGE ENDS 
A Covered Person's insurance automatically ends on the first of the following dates: 
(1) The date the Group Policy is terminated; 
(2) The premium due date you fail to pay the required premium, except as provided in the Grace Period; 
(3) The premium due date after you are no longer a member of the Participating Organization; 
(4) The premium due date next following the date the Participating Organization ceases to participate in this plan 
of insurance; 
(5) The premium due date next following your 85th birthdate. 
Your Dependent's insurance automatically ends on the first of the following dates: 
(1) The date your coverage terminates except as provided in the Continuance of Dependent Insurance Provision; 
(2) The premium due date after a Covered Person ceases to be an eligible Dependent. 
If an insured dependent child attains the specified age limit and proof is submitted within 31 days that the child: 
(1) is not able to become gainfully employed because of mental retardation or physical handicap; 
(2) became so incapable prior to the age limit; and 
(3) is primarily dependent on you for support and maintenance, 
then the age limit will not apply as long as the child continues to meet these conditions. The child will be insured for the 
same benefits he previously had. Proof of continued disability and dependency may be required but not more often than 
once a year. Such child's insurance will not continue beyond the date it would otherwise end. 
CONTINUANCE OF DEPENDENT INSURANCE. If you die while insured under the Group Policy, your spouse may 
continue coverage if insured. The spouse's premium will be based on his attained age. Coverage may also continue for 
any Dependent Children covered at the time of your death at the applicable premium. However, if there is no spouse 
upon your death, coverage for Dependent Children will end. 
Termination of the Group Policy will not prejudice any claim originating prior to termination subject to all other terms of 
the Group Policy. 
PREMIUMS 
We provide insurance coverage in return for premium payment. Premiums are payable by you. Your first premium is 
due on your Effective Date. Premiums are paid to us on or before the due date. The initial premium rates are shown on 
your Certificate Schedule. 
PREMIUM CHANGES. We have the right to change the premium rates on any premium due date. We will provide written 
notice at least 31 days before the date of change. The premium rates may also be changed at any time the terms of the 
Group Policy are changed. 
Premiums may be paid monthly, quarterly, semi-annually, or annually. The premium mode may be changed by sending 
us a written request. Upon our approval, the change will be made. 
GRACE PERIOD. You have a 31 day grace period for the payment of each premium due aftar the first premium. 
Coverage will continue in force during the grace period. It will terminate at the end of the grace period if all premiums 
which are due are not paid. We will require payment of all premiums for the period this coverage continues in force 
including the premiums for the grace period. 
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nc i roo iMic rv i tm u r INOUMANOE if AS terminate insurance for nonDavment cf premium vou may reinstate 
coverage within 90 days follown * last jnpaid oremiun due date You must f all overdue oremiums The reinstated 
policy will not cover a loss <vh.ch jccjrrea du »^ q f h^ JDS9 eerier 
UNPAID PREMIUM i V h ^ a : iai^ * oa c tor e<oen, „ - „ e - .ur n j n - 3race Period any premium due and unpaid 
may bo deducted from t r s :>a n ^a* rant 
GENERAL PROVISIONS 
BENEFICIARY CHANGES You may name an/person *o be ,our Beneficiary at the time of enrollment You may change 
your Beneficiary at any time When we receive and record the change request it will take effect as of the date you signed 
it If you die prior to the date we receive and record the change any payment we make to the new Beneficiary will be 
valid The prior Beneficiary's interest ends the date the new designation takes effect 
If more than one Beneficiary is named without stating their respective interests, they will share equally If a Beneficiary 
dies before you, that interest ends The Beneficiaries that survive will share equally unless you make a written request 
to the contrary 
You are your Dependent's Beneficiary If you die before your Dependent, any benefit for the Dependent will be paid to 
the first surviving class of the following The Dependent's spouse, children, parents, brothers and sisters, executors or 
administrators. 
INCONTESTABILITY. No statement made by you can be used in a contest after your insurance has been in force two 
years during your lifetime No statement you make can be used in a contest unless it is in writing and signed by you 
MISSTATEMENT OF AGE. If the age of a Covered Person has been misstated in the enrollment form for insurance 
under the Group Policy, the benefits payable will be those which the premiums paid would have purchased based upon 
his correct age, otherwise, there will be an equitable adjustment of premiums 
OPTIONAL SETTLEMENT METHODS. You, or the Beneficiary after the Covered Person's death, may elect to have 
loss of life benefits paid in installments Such election must be sent to us in writing. The amounts and terms of the 
installments will be those which we offer at the time of election 
OTHER INSURANCE IN THIS COMPANY. The Covered Person may only have an aggregate of $1,000,000 of 
accidental death insurance in force with us or any other AEGON, U S A., Inc affiliate at one time If we determine that 
accidental death insurance is in force in excess of this amount, the Covered Person must choose which coverage he 
wants to remain active All other insurance will be terminated All premiums paid for canceled certificates or policies will 
be returned to you. 
RIGHT TO EXAMINE. The Policy is in the possession of the Policyholder, it will be available to be inspected by you at 
any time during business hours at his office 
WHEN THERE IS A CLAIM 
NOTICE OF CLAIM. We must be given written notice of claim within 20 days after a covered loss occurs If notice cannot 
be given within that time, it must be given as soon as reasonably possible 
The notice trust contain the Covered Person's name and enoi qh information to identify him Notice may be mailed to 
our Home Office or to our agent 
CLAIM FORMS. When we receive notice of claim, the Covered Person will be sent forms to file proof of loss If the 
forms are not sent within 15 days after we receive notice then the Covered Person will meet the proof of loss 
requirements by giving us a written statement of the nature and extent of the loss This must be sent to us within the 
time limit stated in the Proof of Loss provision 
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PROOF OF LOSS. Written proof must be sent to us within 90 days after the date the loss occurs. If it was not reasonably 
possible to give us written proof within 90 days, we will nof reduce or deny a claim for this reason, if it is shown that 
written proof of the loss was given as soon as reasonably possible. 
PAYMENT OF CLAIMS. Claims for benefits provided by the Group Policy will be paid as soon as written proof is received. 
Benefits for loss of life will be paid in accordance with the Beneficiary designation in effect at the time of payment. All 
other benefits are paid directly to the Covered Person, unless otherwise directed. If a benefit is unpaid at his death or 
if we feel he is not able to give a valid receipt for payment, we may pay an amount up to $1,000 to any relative by blood 
or marriage who we deem to be equitably entitled. 
If a Beneficiary is a minor and there is no parent or legal guardian, or if he cannot give a valid release, the benefit will 
be paid as follows: to the person or institution we decide has assumed custody or support of the Beneficiary. 
Any payment that we make in good faith will fully discharge us to the extent of that payment. 
RIGHT OF RECOVERY. If payments for claims exceed the maximum amount payable under any benefit provisions or 
riders of the Group Policy, we have the right to recover the excess of such payments. 
PHYSICAL EXAMINATION AND AUTOPSY. At our experse, we have the right to have the Covered Person examined 
as often as necessary while a claim is pending. At our expense, we may require an autopsy unless the law forbids it. 
LEGAL ACTIONS. No legal action may be brought to recover against the Group Policy within 60 days after written proof 
of loss has been given. No such action will be brought after three years from the time written proof of loss is required 
to be given. 
If a time limit of the Group Policy is less than allowed by the laws of the state where the Covered Person lives, the limit 




l l l C COMPANY 
(referred to as we, us, our) 
CERTIFICATE OF INSURANCE 
Subject to the terms of Policy No. MZ 0800175/056IF, issued to: 
y 
We certify that, subject to the terms of the Group Policy, the Member to whom this Certificate is issued (referred to as you, your 
and yours) is insured for the benefits described in this Certificate on and following the effective date on which he is eligible. 
In this Certificate Monumental Life Insurance Company will be called we, our or us. This Certificate summarizes certain provisions 
of the Group Policy. All coverage and provisions are subject to those in the Group Policy issued to the Policyholder. 
Your Age at Death 
Under Age 65 
Age 65 but less than age 75 
Age 75 but less than age 80 
Age 80 but less than age 85 






*Benefits terminate on the premium due date following the date you attain age 85. 
DEFINITIONS 
When used in this Certificate the following words and phrases ru vc the meaning given. The use of an> personal pronoun includes 
both genders. 
INJURY means bodily injury caused by an accident. The accident must occur while your insurance is in force under the Group 
Policy. The Injury must be the direct cause of loss and must be independent of all other causes. The Injury must not be caused by 
or contributed to by Sickness. 
PARTICIPATING ORGANIZATION means an Organization which has signed a Participation Agreement adopting the 
Policyholder's plan of insurance. 
SICKNESS means an illness or disease which results in a covered loss while insurance for the Covered Person is in force under 
the Policy. 
ACCIDENTAL DEATH BENEFIT 
When we receive due proof that you die, we will pay the benefit shown on the Schedule of Benefits to your named Beneficiary, 
provided: 
(1) death occurs as a direct result of an Injury; and 
(2) death occurs within 365 days of the accident causing the Injury. 
TRUSTEES OF THE NATIONAL FINANCIAL £ 
INSTITUTION GROUP INSURANCE TRUST ! | 
c/o First Security Bank 
(the Policyholder) 
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EXCLUSIONS 
We will not pay a benefit for a loss which is cmsed by, results from, or contributed to by 
(1) suicide, attempted suicide or intentionally self-inflicted injury, while sane or insane (in Missouri while sane), 
(2) declared or undeclared war or any act of war, 
(3) full-time military service; 
(4) participating in a riot; committing an assault or felony; 
(5) Sickness or its medical or surgical treatment, including diagnosis; 
(6) bacterial infection except through a wound accidentally sustained; 
(7) operating or riding in any kind of aircraft except as a fare-paying passenger on a regularly scheduled commercial flight, 
(8) alcohol intoxication; 
(9) taking of any drug, medication, narcotic or hallucinogen, unless as prescribed by a Physician; 
(10) taking of alcohol in combination with any drug, medication or sedative; 
(11) voluntary gas inhalation or poisonj/oluntarily taken, administered or inhaled, 
(12) riding or driving as a professional in any kind of race for prize money or profit. 
WHEN COVERAGE ENDS 
Your insurance automatically ends on the first of the following dates: 
(1) The date the Group Policy is terminated; 
(2) The premium due date following the termination of your account with the Participating Organization; 
(3) The premium due date next following the date the Participating Organization ceases to participate in this plan; 
(4) The premium due date next following your 85th birthdate or your 5th anniversary, whichever occurs first. 
Termination of the Group Policy will not prejudice any claim originating prior to termination subject to all other terms of the Group 
Policy. 
GENERAL PROVISIONS 
BENEFICIARY. Your Beneficiary shall be as specified on the records of the Administrator. 
RIGHT TO EXAMINE. The Policy is in the possession of the Policyholder; it will be available to be inspected by you at any time 
during business hours. 
WHEN THERE IS A CLAIM 
NOTICE OF CLAIM. Claims for benefits provided by the Group Policy will be ^ aid as soon as written proof is received. Benefits 
for loss of life will be paid in accordance with the Beneficiary designation in effect at the time of payment. All other benefits are 
paid directly to you. 
If a Beneficiary is a minor and there is no parent or legal guardian, or if he cannot give a valid release, the benefit will be paid as 
follows: to the person or institution we decide has assumed custody or support of the Beneficiary. 
Any payment that we make in good faith will fully discharge us to the extent of that payment. 
PHYSICAL EXAMINATION AND AUTOPSY. At our expense, we have the right to have you examined as often as necessary 
while a claim is pending. At our expense, we may require an autopsy unless the law forbids it. 
LEGAL ACTIONS, No legal action may be brought to recover against the Group Policy within 60 days after written proof of loss 
has been given. No such action will be brought after three years from the time written proof of loss is required to be given. 
If a time limit of the Group Policy is less than allowed by the laws of the state where the Covered Person lives, the limit is extended 
to meet the minimum time allowed by such law. 
MONUMENTAL LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY 
Secretary Presraent 
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